The Effect of Information on Gender Differences in Competitiveness: Experimental Evidence by Seda Ertac & Balazs Szentes
KOÇ UNIVERSITY-TÜSİAD ECONOMIC RESEARCH FORUM  















THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON GENDER 









Working Paper 1104 













KOÇ UNIVERSITY-TÜSİAD ECONOMIC RESEARCH FORUM  
Rumeli Feneri Yolu 34450 Sarıyer/Istanbul  















An important line of recent literature has found gender differences in attitudes toward competition, 
with men being more likely to choose competitive incentive schemes, even when factors such as ability 
and risk aversion are controlled for. This paper examines the effect of information on the gender gap in 
tournament entry. We present experimental evidence that the competitiveness difference between men 
and women declines significantly when individuals are given performance feedback before making 
their incentive scheme choice. The result suggests that policies that reduce uncertainty can reduce the 
gender gap in tournament entry. 
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I.  Introduction:  
 
    The issues of gender segregation in occupations and gender disparity in wages have attracted 
considerable attention in the recent years. In the workplace, gender composition at high-level positions 
is quite uneven, and in academic settings, there are strong gender-based selection effects into certain  
programs such as the sciences (see, for example, Blau et al. (2002)). 
    An important line of recent economic research has focused on conducting laboratory and field 
experiments to analyze gender and competitiveness. This research has found that tournaments motivate 
men more than women (e.g. Gneezy et al. (2003), Gneezy (2004)), and that women tend to self-select 
into competitive incentive schemes less than equally able men (Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007)). Giving subjects a choice between tournament and piece-rate incentive 
schemes, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) (NV hereafter) find a stark difference: while 73% of males 
choose the competitive scheme, only 35% of females do. This tendency of women to shy away from 
competition has been offered as a potential explanation for the observed differences in labor market 
outcomes, since top-level positions usually involve competitive career paths. 
     In this paper, we study the availability of information as a potential determinant of the gender gap. 
In the NV study, participants know only their own performance when they make tournament entry 
choice. In many contexts, however, individuals have at least some information about the performance 
of others, sometimes through social interaction and sometimes through performance feedback policies. 
Especially in organizational and educational settings, principals oftentimes have information about the 
performance distribution, and how much of this to reveal to agents is a choice variable. Therefore, from 
a policy perspective it is important to know how the availability of information and the amount of 
uncertainty interact with men and women's competition decisions. In fact, performance feedback 
policies have recently received considerable attention both theoretically (Ederer (2009), Ertac (2006)) 
and in the context of laboratory, field and natural experiments (Azmat and Irriberi (2010), Ertac (2009), 
Barankay (2010)). 
    Our experimental manipulation involves giving subjects information about the highest performance 
in their group in a previous tournament, before they make their tournament entry choice. While our no-
information treatment replicates the NV results (men competing significantly more than women do), 
there is no significant difference in competition percentages across gender when subjects can condition 2 
 
their decisions on information.  Our findings suggest that more transparent performance feedback 
policies can be useful in reducing the gender gap in self-selection into tournaments and increase the 
efficiency of the outcome.
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    The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the experimental design and procedures, 
Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 provides a discussion and concluding remarks. 
     
II.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
    We follow the design in NV quite closely, in order to facilitate comparison with their results. The 
experiment consists of three periods. In each period, subjects work on an addition task for 5 minutes, 
where they are asked to add sets of five 2-digit numbers. In the first period, subjects work under a 
piece-rate incentive scheme, where they earn 50 cents per question they solve correctly. In the second 
period, they are assigned to 4-person groups (composed of 2 men and 2 women), and solve questions 
under a tournament scheme. Under this compensation scheme, they receive 2 dollars per correct 
answer, but only if they were the best performer in their group. In case of ties, the winner is determined 
randomly. The third period gives subjects a choice between the piece-rate and tournament incentive 
schemes. In NV, competing in this third period amounts to competing with the best performance of the 
opponents in the period-2 tournament. That is, subjects who chose the tournament receive money if 
their performance in the third period exceeds the best performance of the others in their group in the 
second period. The difference between our setup and NV is that before the choice, we give subjects 
information about the best performance of the others in the group in the period-2 tournament, 
essentially giving them information about the performance target that they need to surpass for receiving 
a prize.  In order to address the possibility that differences in the subject pool can cause differences in 
behavior, we also ran two control sessions with 40 subjects, which replicated NV's design. This control 
treatment did not have the information stage.
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1 Given that males and females have similar performance, the gender gap in entry leads to an inefficient outcome, since 
lower-ability males over-enter and higher-ability females under-enter.  
2 Experimental instructions are available upon request.  3 
 
    The experiments were conducted at the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory 
(CASSEL), using undergraduate UCLA students as subjects.
3 In total, 148 subjects participated, 74 
men and 74 women. 8 sessions were conducted. Each participant received a $5 show-up fee, a fixed 
payment of $7 for completing the experiment, plus their earnings from performance. Earnings from 
performance were calculated by randomly selecting one of the 3 periods and implementing the 
corresponding payment scheme. A volunteer subject threw a die at the end of the experiment, which 
determined which period would count for payoffs. Sessions lasted less than an hour, with payments 
averaging around $20. 
 
III.  Results 
 
      Performance in the task is significantly higher under the tournament than the piece-rate incentive 
scheme (Wilcoxon test, p=0.0000), and no significant difference exists in either piece-rate performance 
or tournament performance across genders (Mann-Whitney test, z=0.97 and z=0.93 for piece-rate and 
tournament, respectively).  Our main result concerns the choice of incentive scheme in the presence of 
performance feedback. In the information treatment, roughly 44% of the women and 48% of the men 
choose the tournament. A chi-square test of proportions shows that there is no significant gender 
difference in the decision to compete (p=0.70).
4 This is in stark contrast to NV's results, where 35% of 
women and 73% of men chose to compete. Naturally, this difference could come from differences in 
the subject pool, as well as the fact that the tournament environment is less uncertain than in NV. To 
account for this, possibility we use data from the control (no information) treatment. When subjects 
decide without information, 60% of the males and 30% of the females compete. This difference is 
statistically significant (p=0.056 with a two-sided and p=0.028 with a one-sided test of proportions), 
replicating NV's results. This suggests that the difference between the two treatments stem from the 
difference in information rather than subject pool—with information, the proportion of competing 
women increases, while that of competing men decreases.  
      An important question is whether the reduction in the gender gap comes from increases in 
competitive choices by high-performing females, or decreases in the competitiveness of low-
                                                           
3 The experiment was computerized using the z-tree software (Fischbacher (1999)).  
 
4 A two-sample test of proportions also confirms this result, with p=0.69. 4 
 
performing males, or both. In order to understand this, we consider the choices of males and females 
with above- and below-median performance in the forced (period 2) tournament, across the information 
treatments. Figure 1 shows that the reduction in the gap stems mainly from the increase in competitive 
choices by high-performing females—the competition rate in this group increases from 38% to 65% 
with information. 
<Figure 1 about here> 
         In addition to the data on incentive scheme choice, we also collected some information on self-
professed competitiveness and risk-aversion through an end-of-experiment survey.
5  In order to see the 
effects of these characteristics on competitive choice, we consider the following regression model: 
 
compete=f(β0+ β1*female+ β2*info + β3* female*info + β4*competitive+ β5*risk-loving) 
where info is the treatment dummy and f(.)= is the standard logit function.  
      The results of this regression are given in Table 1. The information treatment significantly increases 
the  propensity  of  women  to  compete,  and  self-professed  competitiveness  and  risk-loving  are  both 
significant as well.     
<Table 1 about here> 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
      After the documentation of gender differences in competitiveness, the next natural step in the 
research agenda has been to understand what types of institutional factors can influence the observed 
difference.  One crucial policy variable in this respect is the availability of information. We find that 
with more performance information, there is no significant difference between men and women in 
terms of competitive choice. This suggests that feedback policies that reduce the uncertainty inherent in 
competitive settings can motivate women to enter tournaments more, and reduce the gender gap. One 
channel through which the observed effect of information in this paper might be working is ambiguity 
aversion, since it is subjective beliefs that determine the competition choice. In experiments, gender 
                                                           
5 Because of a software problem, survey data was lost for 19 subjects.  5 
 
differences in ambiguity aversion have been found in some contexts but not others (Borghans et al. 
(2009), Schubert et al. (1999)). Further research that manipulates the type/level of 
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Figure 1: Frequency of Individuals Who Compete, by Gender, Performance and Treatment 
 
 












TABLE 1: Logistic Regression of the Decision to Compete 
   
Female  -1.095 
(0.708)    
Information   -0.672 
(0.574)    
Female*information   1.697** 
(0.854)                      
Risk-loving  0.258** 
(0.125)      
Competitive  0.293** 
(0.121)   
   
   
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses 
beneath the coefficient estimates. *’s denote 
significance at levels; *** p<0.01, ** 













1.  Instructions 
 
Welcome to CASSEL. This is an experiment on decision-making.  
 
In the experiment today you will be asked to complete three different tasks. None of these will 
take more than 5 minutes. At the end of the experiment you will receive $7 for having completed the 
three tasks, in addition we will randomly select one of the tasks and pay you based on your 
performance in that task. Once you have completed the three tasks, we will determine which task 
counts for payment by drawing a number between 1 and 3. The method we will use to determine your 
earnings varies across tasks. Before each task we will describe in detail how 
your payment is determined. 
 
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment for the randomly 
selected task, your $7-payment for completing the tasks, and a $5 show up fee. Please do not talk with 
one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
Task 1 – Piece Rate 
 
We will now explain you the first task of the experiment. For Task 1 you will be asked to calculate the 
sum of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers. 
 
You will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of these problems. You cannot use 
a calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use 
of the provided scratch paper. You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. 
Your answers to the problems are anonymous. 
 
If Task 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you get 50 cents per problem you 
solve correctly in the 5 minutes. Your payment does not decrease if you provide an incorrect 
answer to a problem. We refer to this payment as the piece rate payment. 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
Task 2 – Tournament 
 
As in Task 1 you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the sum of a series of five 2-digit numbers. 
However, for this task your payment depends on your performance relative to that of a group of other 
participants. Each group consists of four people, the three other members of your group are located in 
the same row as you (note: each row had 4 people).  If Task 2 is the one randomly selected for 
payment, then your earnings depend on the number of problems you solve compared to the three other 
people in your group. The individual who correctly solves the largest number of problems will receive 
$2 per correct problem, while the other participants receive no payment. We refer to this as the 10 
 
tournament payment scheme. If there are ties the winner will be randomly determined. Please do not 
talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
Task 3 - Choice 
 
As in the previous two tasks you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series 
of five 2-digit numbers. However you will now get to choose which of the two previous payment 
schemes you prefer to apply to your performance on the third task. 
 
If Task 3 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this task are determined as 
follows. If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per problem you solve correctly. If you 
choose the tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to the performance of the other 
three participants of your group in the Task 2 -tournament. The Task 
2-tournament is the one you just completed. If you correctly solve more problems than they did in Task 
2, then you receive four times the payment from the piece rate, which is $2 per correct problem. You 
will receive no earnings for this task if you choose the tournament and do not solve more problems 
correctly in Task 3, than the others in your group did in the Task-2 tournament. If there are ties the 
winner will be randomly determined. 
 
Before you make your choice, you are going to be given information on what the best performance of 
the three other members of your group was, in Task 2. Remember that if you choose the tournament, 
this is the performance that you will need to exceed.  
 
The next computer screen will give you the information about group performance, and ask you to 
choose whether you want the piece rate or the tournament applied to your performance in Task 3. You 
will then be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of five randomly chosen two-digit 
numbers. 
 
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
2.  End of Experiment Survey 
 
Do you consider yourself a “competitive” person? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “not 
competitive at all”, and 10 being “extremely competitive”. __________ 
 
How would you rate your attitudes toward risk on a scale of 1 to 10? (1: I am extremely risk-averse, 10: 
I am extremely risk-loving) ______________ 
 
Do you think men or women would do better in this addition task?  
 11 
 
Men _____ 
Women______ 
No difference______ 
 
Gender: _____ 
 
 